![]() Too often in the book, Wright uses Begin as a recalcitrant stickman for Carter’s exaggerated statesmanship. We see how on numerous occasions, crumbling three-way communication brought the summit to the precipice of collapse. ![]() Instead of addressing these and Begin’s political needs, Carter expended great energy cajoling both Begin and Sadat towards compromises. To make concessions to Israel, Sadat had to have tangible and absolute concessions of his own. Regarding Sadat, Carter is also shown to neglect the emotions of Arab populism that were so central to Sadat’s credibility as a leader. More precisely, Carter underestimated the psychological legacy of the Holocaust and the Yom Kippur war in shaping Begin’s hesitancy to trust Sadat’s proposals. He struggled to accept that for Begin, relinquishing the Sinai settlements would eliminate a security buffer against future Egyptian attack and invite fury from the Israeli right. Believing he could persuade Begin and Sadat to make concessions that were, in his mind, eminently reasonable, Carter failed to understand his fellow leaders’ points of view. ![]() Though Wright underplays the issue, it is clear that Carter greatly misjudged the early days of the summit. Throughout the book, Carter is presented as an almost saint like figure.ĭescribing the minutiae of Camp David life-the morning walks, uneven emotions and many alternating policy proposals-Wright sometimes gets lost in the details. Indeed, Wright’s study of Carter is often a little incongruous with the great difficulties the summit often suffered. After all, they emphasize the challenges that Carter faced: Managing Sadat’s unpredictability, and moving Begin, despite his apparently unyielding personality. As prime minister, Begin’s psychological wounds came to be seen by Israelis as "ennobling, not crippling his ferocity and intransigence appeared to be appropriate responses to the dangers Israelis faced." As with Sadat, Wright illuminates Begin’s early political history: his leadership of the Irgun group, which used political violence to forge his nation.Īlthough Wright spends time on Jimmy Carter’s character, his early assessments of Sadat and Begin are far more useful. Noting Begin’s imprisonment by the Soviets and his struggles during the Holocaust (in which both of his parents were murdered), Wright describes the Israeli Prime Minister’s resoluteness. ![]() In Menachem Begin, Wright portrays a hardened spirit forged by great suffering during his early years. Wright describes an eccentric and often capricious personality: Sadat’s personal habits included lying daily on the floor of his bedroom "with a scarf over his eyes" and a passion for American westerns. ![]() From his early years spent in violent uprisings and conspiracy with Nazi spies, to his failed 1973 invasion of Israel, peace was a late endeavor for the Egyptian leader. Forged by his hatred for British colonialism in Egypt and driven by a sense of destiny, Sadat was no simple peacemaker. In Anwar Sadat, Wright presents a man of great internal contradictions. In rich narrative detail-though unfortunately with all-too-conventional analysis-Wright profiles the three men who forged a lasting agreement between Israel and Egypt: Sadat, Begin, and Carter. Examining thirteen days at Camp David in early September 1978, in his latest book Lawrence Wright explains how peace triumphed over the threat of further war. ![]()
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